The most popular concepts of happiness among psychologists and philosophers nowadays are concepts of happiness according to which happiness is defined as "satisfaction with life as a whole". Such concepts are "Whole Life Satisfaction" (WLS) concepts of happiness. I show tha t there are hundreds of nonequivalent ways in which a WLS conception of happiness can be developed. However, every precise conception either requires actual satisfaction with life as a whole or requires hypothetical satisfaction with life as a whole. I show that a person can be "happy" (in any familiar sense that might be relevant to eudaimonism) at a time even though he is not actually satisfied with his life as a whole at that time. I also show that a person can be "happy" at a time even though it is not correct to say that if he were to think about his life at that time, he would be satisfied with it as a whole. My thesis is that if you think that happiness is the Good, you should avoid defining happiness as whole life satisfaction.
But this gives rise to a deeper question: precisely what are we saying when we say that a person is "happy" (using the word descriptively)? What is this state that (according to eudaimonism) bears so essentially on welfare? If we don't know what happiness is, then we don't fully understand the eudaimonistic thesis.
A glance at the literature reveals a multitude of theories about the nature of happiness. Mill and others in the utilitarian tradition have said that happiness is fundamentally a matter of pleasure and pain 3 . To be happy, on this view, is to have a positive hedono-doloric balance. Others in the preferentist tradition have said that to be happy to be getting what you want -or in some versions -to be getting what you wo uld have wanted if you had the benefit of full information about your circumstances. 4 Still others have said other things. 5 In recent years, however, the most popular view about happiness is "whole life satisfactionism" (WLS). On this view, to be happy is to be satisfied with your life as a whole. A eudaimonist who adopts the WLS approach can be understood to have endorsed two doctrines. The first is an account of the nature of happiness as a psychological state. In some cases it seems to be offered as a theory about what 'happy' means in ordinary English, but more often it seems to be offered as an explication or stipulative definition. The philosopher might say: "For purposes of theory construction, let us understand 'happy' in its descriptive sense to mean 'satisfied with life as a whole'". The second component of his view is the axiological part. The WLS eudaimonist says that the happier a person is (in his preferred WLS sense of 3 "By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure." (Mill, 1962, 257 . Emphasis added, FF) 4 I discuss a view like this below in Section 5. 5 For example, there is the "mood theory" defended by Daniel Haybron in Haybron (2001) .
'happier'), the better his life is going for him. In other words, a person's welfare level is alleged to be determined by his level of happiness, where happiness is understood to be whole life satisfaction.
WLS concepts of happiness are the subject of this paper. One of my aims is to show that there are many different and inequivalent WLS concepts of happiness. As a result there are at least as many different and inequivalent forms of WLS eudaimonism.
My central thesis is that if we make use of a WLS concept of happiness, and then go on to use this concept in a form of eudaimonism, that form of eudaimonism is seriously implausible.
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I begin by giving some examples of philosophers who seem to endorse the WLS approach.
Whole Life Satisfaction Theories of Happiness
WLS concepts of happiness have been proposed by Richard Brandt, John Kekes, Robert Nozick, Wayne Sumner, Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, Elizabeth Telfer, G. H. von Wright and many others. While every one of these concepts of happiness requires "whole life satisfaction" in some form or other, they are not equivalent. 6 I also think -though I won't try to establish it here -that WLS definitions of happiness do a poor job of explicating any concept that eudaimonists actually have in mind when they say that happiness is the good. If I am right about this, then anyone who thinks that happiness increases welfare should be inclined to say, 'I think happiness is the good; and I think the concept of happiness is obscure; but I surely do not think that happiness should be defined as being satisfied with your life as a whole.' 7 Each of these philosophers offers a WLS concept of happiness. In some cases it is offered simply as an account of the nature of happiness. In other cases it is offered as a stipulative definition as part of a larger a. Tatarkiewicz says that happiness (in the most important sense of the term) is 'satisfaction with one's life as a whole.' (Tatarkiewicz, 1966: 1) He apparently means to defend the view that if a person is happy then he must not only be fully satisfied with the current segment of his life, he must be satisfied with the past segment of his life and the segment of his life that is yet to come. 8 In his discussion of happiness and time he makes the point explicitly:
Satisfaction with life as a whole must be satisfaction not only with that which is, but also with that which was and that which will be, not only with the present, but also with the past and the future. (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 140). b. Elizabeth Telfer (Telfer, 1980) formulates the theory in a different way. 9 She says:
My suggestion for a definition of happiness, then, is that it is a state of being pleased with one's life as a whole... (Telfer, 1980: 8-9) Telfer expands upon this by saying that 'a happy man does not want anything major in his life to be otherwise; he is pleased with, that is wants (to keep), what he has project about welfare. In yet other cases it is offered in other ways. I do not mean to suggest that all of these philosophers propose the same account of happiness, or that they use the account of happiness in the same way. 8 Tatarkiewicz acknowledges that 'happy' is multiply ambiguous and vague in ordinary language. He claims, however, that in one of its two main ordinary senses, it means satisfaction with life as a whole. He claims that this is the crucial sense since happiness, thus understood, is "one of the greatest goods accessible to man." (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 4) After further reflection, Tatarkiewicz revises this account, saying instead that ideal happiness is "lasting, complete, and justified satisfaction with life." (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 16) 9 Telfer also claims that 'happy' is ambiguous in ordinary language. Like Tatarkiewicz, she claims that in the most important sense, and the sense of greatest interest to moral philosophers, it expresses the concept of whole life satisfaction.
got; there is nothing major which he has not got and which he wants (to get).' (Telfer, 1980: 8) c. Richard Brandt (Brandt 1967) states two conditions for happiness. Brandt says:
....the following proposal for a definition of "happy" may be suggested. ... in order to be happy it is necessary that one like ... those parts of one's total life pattern and circumstances that one thinks are important. To say that one likes them is in part to say that one is "satisfied" with them -that one does not wish them to be substantially different, and that they measure up, at least roughly, to the life ideal one had hoped to attain; ... [We] would not call a man happy if he did not frequently feel joy or enthusiasm or enjoy what he was doing or experiencing. (Brandt, 1967: 413-4) Brandt apparently means to be proposing an account of what it means to say that a person had a happy life, or was a happy person. His idea seems to be that in order to be a happy person, one must meet two conditions. First, one must be satisfied with the life one in fact has lived -that life must measure up (or must be believed to measure up) sufficiently to the "life ideal" one had hoped to attain. Secondly, one must have felt joy or enthusiasm frequently during that life.
d. Like Brandt, Wayne Sumner claims that in order to have a happy life, a person must (a) be satisfied with his life as a whole, and (b) enjoy certain moods or emotions.
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Sumner describes the first component in these words:
The cognitive aspect of happiness consists in a positive evaluation of the conditions of your life, a judgement that, at least on balance, it measures up favourably against your standards or expectations. This evaluation may be global, covering all of the important sectors of your life, or it may focus on one in particular (your work, say, or your family). In either case it represents an affirmation or endorsement of (some or all of) the conditions or circumstances of your life, a judgement that, on balance and taking everything into account, your life is going well for you. (Sumner, 1996: 145) The second component of Sumner's analysis is the affective component. Sumner requires that a happy person experience "a sense of well-being" that is directed upon a specific object -his life as a whole.
The affective side of happiness consists in what we commonly call a sense of well-being: finding your life enriching or rewarding, or feeling satisfied or fulfilled by it. (Sumner, 1996: 146) Views relevantly like these have been proposed by many other philosophers and psychologists. But for present purposes this brief catalogue should be sufficient. All 10 Neither Sumner nor Brandt claims that a person's welfare level is directly determined by the amount of happiness he enjoys. Sumner, for example, claims that welfare 'consists in authentic happiness, the happiness of an informed and autonomous subject.' (Sumner, 1996:172) these definitions -and others relevant ly like them -introduce WLS concepts of happiness.
Two Preliminary Problems
WLS conceptions of happiness seem to confront two closely related problems right at the outset. I believe, however, that neither instability nor lability is a genuine problem. In each case, a problem seems to arise primarily because the theory has not been formulated clearly. In order to state it clearly, we must start by drawing a distinction between two WLS concepts. The fundamental concept is a concept of whole life satisfaction at a moment. This is just the amount of the relevant sort of whole life satisfaction that a subject has at a moment. The second concept would be a concept of whole life satisfaction during an interval based upon some sort of aggregation of information concerning whole life satisfaction levels at moments within the interval.
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Let me sketch one way of making use of this distinction. Suppose a subject, S, is satisfied with his life as a whole to different degrees at different moments. At t1, he is satisfied to degree 4 with his life as a whole. At t2, he is satisfied to degree 6, and so on.
Suppose he is dissatisfied with his life as a whole at some other moments during the interval. At t16, for example, he is satisfied to degree -2 with his life as a whole. If all of these momentary satisfaction-with-life-as-a-whole levels are plotted on a graph, we get a line as follows: Graph 1 We can define the subject's whole life satisfaction for the interval t1-t17 simply as the integral of his momentary life satisfactions for the moments during the interval.
Thus we recognize the fact that whole life satisfaction varies from time to time. We incorporate this fact into our calculations, letting life satisfaction during a stretch of time be determined (roughly) by the total amount of life satisfaction the person experiences during that time, minus the total amount of life dissatisfaction.
14 Advocates of the WLS approach to happiness can then say that a person's happiness at a moment is equal to his level of whole life satisfaction at that moment; and happiness in life as a whole is equal to his whole life satisfaction for the interval that is his whole life. The fact that there were times when he was not satisfied with his life as a whole does not introduce a contradiction; it just lowers his net whole life satisfaction 14 There are other ways of doing the aggregating. We might focus instead on average levels of momentary life satisfaction; we might focus on highs and lows; there are other options. I presuppose this method of aggregation primarily for simplicity in exposition.
level and thus his total amount of happiness in life. Thus the instability problem does not arise.
What of the lability problem? Suppose a subject finds a lost dollar bill at a certain time. Suppose that a moment later he judges his life as a whole to be going very well.
Suppose he would not have made such a favorable judgment about his life as a whole if he had not found the dollar bill. Must we then worry that his judgment is somehow "wrong" and needs to be disregarded in our calculations? I think not. I think this lability is not a problem. Advocates of the WLS approach should just recognize that in fact subjects are temporarily made somewhat happier by seemingly trivial facts. Their outlook on life as a whole can be brightened even by finding a lost dollar bill or sitting in an interview room with an attractive interviewer. Thus, there is nothing wrong with saying that they are somewhat happier (for a moment) even though the increase in happiness is based on quite a trivial factor.
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If we choose to formulate the theory in this way the crucial question concerns whole life satisfaction at moments. Precisely how are the satisfaction-with-life-at-amoment points determined?
Some Distinctions and a Multitude of Concepts
15 In Chapter 4 of his forthcoming book, Daniel Haybron discusses this problem. He points out that some researchers worry that this "fickleness" of life satisfaction reports indicates that such reports have 'little grounding in any important reality and are not to be taken seriously'. (Haybron, forthcoming, Ch. 4) It should be obvious even from the smattering of quotations at the outset that it is not the case that advocates of the WLS approach have committed themselves to precisely the same view. Let us consider some of the respects in which these formulations differ.
a. Some of these formulations suggest that whole life satisfaction is something very "cognitive" and "judgmental". Others suggest that it is something much more emotional.
According to a judgmental view, in order to be satisfied with his life a person must make a judgment about his life -perhaps (as Sumner says) the "judgement that, on balance and taking everything into account, your life is going well for you." According to a more emotional view, it would not be necessary to make any judgment. All that would be necessary is that the person should "feel good" about his life as a whole. 16 Tatarkiewicz seems also to opt for a conception of satisfaction that involves both an intellectual and an emotional element. (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 12) like this. 'it is enough that he would be satisfied if he were to think of it'. (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 10) Again, the difference is obvious. Someone might never think about his life as a whole, and might never form any judgment about whether it was satisfactory, yet he might be the sort of person who would have formed a favorable judgment about his life, if he had given it any thought. Let us introduce some terminology here to mark this difference.
An actualist view would say that such a person is not happy because he did not actually 17 Sumner says that a person is happy if she is satisfied with "some or all of the conditions or circumstances of her life" (Sumner, 1996: 156) . I am puzzled by the suggestion that a person could be declared happy if she were satisfied with merely some of the conditions of her life. Surely that is far too weak. Suppose she is profoundly dissatisfied with most of the conditions of her life (including her health, her wealth, her level of freedom, her marriage, and her job), but satisfied with just two minor ones (her internet access is fast; her TV reception is good). Perhaps (though he never says quite this) Sumner's idea is rather that a person is happy in a certain area of life iff she is satisfied with the conditions of her life in that area.
form the judgment; a hypotheticalist view would say that he is happy because he would have formed the judgment if he had given it some thought.
d. Tatarkiewicz claims that to be happy one must be satisfied with one's whole life -past, present, and future. It appears that his idea was that the ideally happy person somehow conceives of everything that has happened to him, that is happening to him, and that ever will happen to him. He is fully satisfied with all of it, from beginning to end. 18 Tatarkiewicz recognizes that this is beyond the intellectual powers of any actual human being and accordingly concludes that no one is happy (in this robust "ideal" sense). A different view would maintain that to be happy at a time one must be satisfied with the temporal slice of one's life that is then current. Perhaps an advocate of this approach would say that to be happy in life as a whole is to be happy at enough of these moments.
This could happen even if there was no moment at which the happy person were satisfied with anything in his past or future relative to that moment. 19 Yet another view would maintain that to be happy at a time requires that one be satisfied with everything that has happened to him up until that time.
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e. There are people who are confused about their lives. They think certain things have happened to them, but in fact those things have not happened. We might say that happiness requires being satisfied with the things that have actually happened in your life 18 This comes out especially clearly in one of the passages I cited earlier: "Satisfaction with life as a whole must be satisfaction with that which is, but also with that which was, and that which will be, not only with the present, but also with the past and the future." (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 140) 19 There might then be a question about the extent to which such a view still deserves to be classified as a form of "whole life satisfactionism". But if we aggregated information about momentary satisfaction levels so as to generate the subject's whole life satisfaction level, the resulting theory would be in important respects similar to the other theories under consideration here. Thus there is a further dimension on which WLS definitions of happine ss can be located.
This dimension involves the degree of detail and specificity of awareness that is required for happiness. Let us say that a definition is "maximally epistemically demanding" if it requires that the happy person have a complete and detailed conception of his own life; let us say that it is "epistemically lax" if it requires no such detail. Obviously, there are many intermediate degrees of demandingness between these extremes. For every such degree, there is a collection of distinct forms of WLS.
These are six independent distinctions. Judgmentalism can be combined either with actualism or with hypotheticalism; important aspectivalism can be combined with currentism or with up-to-nowism. The same is true for all the distinctions. The result is 21 In choosing this terminology to mark this distinction I follow Tatarkiewicz in (Tatarkiewicz, 1976: 16) that we can formulate hundreds of different WLS definitions of happiness. Let's briefly consider some of the possibilities.
We can formulate a definition of happiness that is (a) judgmental, (b) "important aspectival", (c) actualist, (d) up-to-now-ist, (e) objective, and (f) moderately epistemically demanding. It looks like this:
WLS6: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. there is a certain life that S has actually lived up to t, and at t S actually has a life ideal, and at t, S knows what his life ideal is and has a moderately detailed conception of what has transpired in important aspects of his life up to t, and at t, S judges with respect to the up-to-t segment of his life that important aspects of that life segment match up to degree n with the life ideal that he maintains at t.
A different definition would replace the (b) "important aspectivalism" of WLS6 with "universalism". It would also replace the (d) "up-to-now-ism" with "current slicism".
The resulting definition is:
WLS7: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. there is a certain slice of life that S is actually living at t, and at t S actually has a life ideal, and at t S knows what his life ideal is and S has a moderately detailed conception of what is transpiring in the current slice of his life at t, and at t S judges with respect to the current-at-t slice of his life that it matches up as a whole to degree n with the life ideal that he maintains at t.
22 22 It may seem that WLS7 is not a genuine form of whole life satisfactionism, since the holistic elements of other versions seem to be missing. But it is important to keep in mind that WLS7 gives the criterion for By making suitable substitutions, we can construct hundreds of other WLS concepts of happiness. No pair of these will be exactly equivalent. They give different accounts of happiness at a moment; accordingly, they yield different assessments of happiness in intervals and lives. My claim is that no matter which one we adopt, the version of eudaimonism based on it is seriously implausible.
Actualism and Hypotheticalism
Obviously, however, a detailed discussion of all these WLS concepts of happiness would be tedious. I will proceed in a different way. I will focus on the distinction between actualism and hypotheticalism. Let's consider a form of actualism that is judgmentalist, holistic, temporally universal, objective, and epistemically demanding:
happiness at a moment; to determine how happy a person is in life as a whole, we would have to determine the implications of WLS7 for every moment in the person's life and then aggregate the results. Thus, the holism would return when it comes time to do the aggregating.
WLS1: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. there is a certain life that S actually will end up having lived, and at t S actually has a life ideal, and at t, S knows what his life ideal is and has a detailed conception of what will transpire in his life as a whole, and at t, S actually judges with respect to his whole life (from beginning to end) that it matches up to degree n with the life ideal that S maintains at t.
In addition to being actualist, WLS1 is highly judgmental. It requires that the happy person actually construct a suitable life ideal, and that he actually judge, with respect to the whole life that he actually will have lived, that it matches up to some specific degree to that ideal. In addition, WLS1 requires the happy person to have a comprehensive conception of the life about which he is making this judgment, and it requires him to make a fa vorable judgment with respect to that life. I believe that WLS1
is a fair interpretation of the concept of happiness that Tatarkiewicz had in mind in several passages including one of the passages cited at the outset. 23 If we were to add a clause requiring some sort of favorable emotional attitude, the resulting definition would be similar to Brandt's.
WLS1 introduces a very strange concept of happiness. An incontrovertible empirical fact entails that no actual human being has ever been happy in the sense defined in WLS1. The relevant fact is that no actual human being has the mental capacity to have a sufficiently comprehensive awareness of his whole life from beginning to end. Even Tatarkiewicz, who endorses something like this concept, is well aware of this problem. He says, 'Happiness is to be satisfied with life as a whole; on the other hand, satisfaction of this kind is impossible. It is so because our minds are incapable of comprehending the whole of our life.' 24 As a result, if we define happiness in this way, and then say that a person's welfare level at a time is determined by his happiness level at that time, then we have to say that no actual human being has ever enjoyed positive welfare.
There are various ways in which the requirement for happiness could be weakened. For example, we might replace the universalism of WLS1 with important aspectivalism; we might replace the epistemic demandingness with laxness. The result is:
WLS2: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. there is a certain life that S actually will end up having lived, and at t S actually has a life ideal, and at t, S knows what his life ideal is and has at least a vague conception of what will transpire in his life as a whole, and at t, S actually judges with respect to important aspects of his whole life (from beginning to end) that it matches up to degree n with the life ideal that S maintains at t.
WLS2 is clearly different from WLS1 (and it is perhaps an improvement). But so long as
the definition requires actual judgments about one's life, the central problem will remain.
Things could be going well for a person at a time even though he is not making any 24 Tatarkiewicz (1976: 9 It seems to me that those who are attracted by the fundamental eudaimonistic intuition would want to say that Timmy is (in the relevant but obscure sense) a very happy person. Accordingly, they would want to say that his life is going well for him.
Thus, the concept of happiness defined in WLS2 generates a form of eudaimonism that does not adequately capture the idea that eudaimonists want to endorse.
Another example highlights a different problem. Imagine some philosopher deeply engaged in philosophical contemplation. Suppose he is thinking about a problem in metaphysics, trying to untangle some profound conceptual knots. Suppose this philosopher is doing philosophy for its own sake -it's not "just a job" to him. He really likes doing philosophy. Suppose that this philosopher is so engrossed in his metaphysical reflections that he is giving no thought whatever to himself or his own life. He is focused entirely on the puzzle at hand and, let us imagine, he is beginning to think he sees a possible solution to the metaphysical puzzle that intrigues him. He is excited about the prospect of solving this puzzle.
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The crucial fact about this philosopher is that at the moment described he is not making any judgment about his life as a whole. He is not thinking about his life as a whole. He is not thinking about himself or his circumstances at all. Rather, he is thinking about the metaphysical puzzle. As a result, he is not happy in the sense defined by WLS2; and as a result of that, he would be given a welfare rating of zero by the form of eudaimonism that employs the WLS2 concept of happiness. But surely the philosopher is in fact quite happy at the moment described -he is wholeheartedly engaged in an activity he loves. Those who think that happiness is the good would want to say that the imaginary philosopher is enjoying very high -perhaps maximally highwelfare at this moment.
This problem would arise with respect to any definition of happiness that requires actual judgments either about whole lives, important aspects of lives, or even some aspects of lives. It would arise for any definition that required such judgments about life as a whole, the current slice of life, or life up till now. I think it would arise if it required a judgment about life as it actually is, or if it required a judgment about life as the happy person takes it to be. Some actualist definitions do not require judgment. Such definitions require something more emotional. Consider a version of the view (similar perhaps to Telfer's) that requires nothing more than that the happy person be pleased with his life as a whole.
WLS3: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. there is a certain life that S has lived up until t, and at t, S takes pleasure of degree n in the fact that she has lived that life so far.
The concept of happiness defined in WLS3 is more easily satisfied than the one defined in WLS1. It does not require the happy person to have any life ideal; it does not require 27 The actual moral of this story is a bit more complex: you can be happy at a time even though you are not making any judgments about the extent to which you are satisfied with your life up to that time, or about the extent to which you are satisfied with the current slice of your life, or about the important aspects of your life up to that time, etc.
that she make any judgment about her life as a whole; it does not require that she contemplate the way her life is going to progress in the future, or that she have any attitude toward her future prospects. It demands far less. It demands only that the person take pleasure in the life she has so far lived.
Even this modest requirement is still too stringent. To take pleasure in something at a time, one must at least consider that something. One must at least form some thought about that thing. But surely a person could be happy at a time even though he does not at that moment consider the life he has lived up until then. Suppose the metaphysician described earlier is too engrossed in metaphysical contemplation at a certain moment to
give any thought to the life he has lived up until today. He may be taking pleasure in the fact that a solution seems to be at hand, but he is not thinking about his own life and is not taking pleasure in any autobiographical facts. If we employ the WLS3 definition of happiness, we will have to say that the metaphysician is not happy at that moment. But in spite of this even someone who endorses the underlying eudaimonistic intuition would want to say that things are going well for the metaphysician and that he is happy. After all, he is happy about 28 lots of things -primarily in this example he is happy to be on the verge of solving an interesting puzzle in metaphysics. 29 The main point here is also Let us turn to hypotheticalism. Let us consider versions of the view that make use of the concept of a "would-be" judgment and a "would-be" life ideal. We can say that a person's happiness level at a time is determined not by the judgment he actually makes at that time about the life ideal he actually has at that time, but by the judgment he would have made at that time if he had made one. Consider this:
WLS4: A person, S, is happy to degree n at a time, t, =df. at t, S is such that if he were to reflect on his life as a whole at t, and if he were to formulate a life ideal at t, he would judge that his life as a whole measures up to degree n to that ideal.
WLS4 is intended to define a momentary happiness level for every person, for every moment, whether the person makes a judgment at that moment or not. Information about these momentary happiness levels can then be aggregated so as to yield happiness levels for any interval, including a life as a whole. These happiness levels can then be employed in a eudaimonistic theory of welfare.
The case of the unreflective Timmy may now seem to be resolved. Although he did not think about his life, and did not formulate a life ideal, and did not form any 30 The further options mentioned in fn. 27 apply here as well, suitably revised so as to apply to the more purely emotional versions of WLS.
judgments concerning the extent to which his life as a whole measured up to his ideal, it may appear reasonable to suppose that there is, for each moment in his life, a judgment that he would have made if he had thought about his life as a whole in the appropriate ways. These hypothetical judgments then yield happiness levels for all the moments in Timmy's life. These can then be aggregated so as to yield a lifetime happiness level for
Timmy. Presumably, the lifetime happiness level would be positive.
It is not entirely clear that the proposed method does yield the requisite numbers. Reflecting upon one's life and ideals and considering the extent to which the life measures up to the ideals very well have some impact on a person's emotional state.
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Just raising the question might make a person less glum; it might make him less cheerful.
Consider the case of Timmy again. He is a happy-go-lucky person who in fact never reflects on his life as a whole and hasn't formulated a life ideal. It is consistent with this to suppose that if he were to think about these things, he would become depressed. He might judge that his life as a whole has been a pointless waste. In such a case it would be cruel to force him to face reality; it would be better to leave him to his happy and unexamined life.
We can imagine that every waking moment of Timmy's adult life is like this: he is cheerful, active, smiling, and engaged in activities that he enjoys at that moment, but also such that if he were to reflect at that moment on his life as a whole, and if he were to formulate a life ideal, he would promptly become despondent and would judge his life as a whole to have been worthless. In this case, the judgments that Timmy would make would not reflect his actual situation. For every moment in his adult life, Timmy's would-be judgment gives a number that is lower than the number that a sensitive eudaimonist would assign to him for that moment. The eudaimonist would focus on such things as his smile, his cheerful activity, his engagement in activities that he apparently likes. Thus, Timmy seems to be very happy. But his happiness is in part dependent upon the fact that he is doing things that he enjoys, rather than thinking about his life and his ideals. 32 If he were to turn his attention to questions about these things, he would cease being so happy. Thus, the concept defined by WLS4 is not suitable for use in a eudaimonist criterion of welfare.
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32 My remarks are not intended to presuppose an undefended commitment to some specific analysis of the concept of happiness. I mention the smile, the cheerfulness, the enjoyment etc. simply because I think these things would normally be taken to be indicators of happiness -even if we haven't got any precise account of the nature of happines s. Whatever precisely happiness may be, Timmy seems to have it. 33 The opposite problem is also possible. Consider the case of an unhappy person -Tammy. Tammy in fact never formulates any life ideal and never makes judgments of satisfaction. She's just too glum to think about such things. It might be the case that, at every moment of her adult life, she is such that if she had been asked about her life and her ideals, she would have given these matters some thought; and if she had given them some thought, she would have formulated a life ideal, and she would have realized that her life has not been so bad; and as a result of that, she would have been a lot happier than she in fact was. Tammy is thus an ideal candidate for CBT. The proposed theory yields in Tammy's case a number that is much higher than it should be. She is in fact not a happy person, but the theory says that she is. level at a moment by appeal to some counterfactual judgment, there is always the chance that the numbers will be wrong. 34 I here assume that the counterfactual judgment that the philosopher makes is a judgment about the satisfactoriness of his whole life at the world in which he is making that judgment. Since that is a world in which his metaphysical contemplation has been interrupted, he is annoyed and judges that things are not going well for him. On a different view, his actual happiness would be determined by the counterfactual judgment that he makes concerning the satisfactoriness of his life as a whole at the actual world. Thus the philosopher would be making a judgment about a life in which there has been no interruption. This vie w gives the wrong assessment in the case of a happy person (like Timmy) who in fact does not make a judgment about his actual life, but who, if he were to make a judgment about his actual life, would judge it to be unsatisfactory.
Some philosophers have suggested that the best form of WLS would be one that defines happiness as the amount of life satisfaction that a subject would have if he were to contemplate his own life from an epistemically ideal perspective. 35 In one form, the idea is that a person's level of happiness is to be defined as the amount of whole life satisfaction he would have had if he had been fully informed, logically consistent, and not subject to emotional disturbances. The considerations I have raised here are directly relevant to any such hypothetical form of WLS. Consider a person who for all practical purposes seems to be very happy (again using the word 'happy' in some familiar, vague, ordinary sense) but who is also in an epistemically poor situation for life evaluation.
Suppose he is confused about the actual circumstances of his life. We may imagine that if he were in an epistemically ideal situation for evaluating his life, he would know much more about his life and he would judge it to be much less satisfactory. His is a case in which the old adage "ignorance is bliss" is apt. But note that the proposed definition would declare him to be unhappy. Obviously, any such conclusion would have no relevance to the question we mean to ask. He is blissful in fact. But his blissfulness is in part dependent upon the fact that he is misinformed about his own life. Thus the happiness rankings generated by the imagined forms of WLS would be wide of the mark.
The opposite case is perhaps even more striking. Suppose Tammy is glum and miserable. She has a frown on her face all the time. She is contemplating suicide. Her misery, let us suppose, is in part due to some faulty judgments. She thinks she is a worthless sinner; she thinks everyone hates her; she thinks her life has been a waste.
Anyone with eudaimonistic leanings would want to say that Tammy's life is not going well for her. Yet it is consistent with all this to suppose that if Tammy were to view her life from an epistemically ideal perspective, she wo uld find it far more satisfactory. If she knew that she was in fact not a sinner, and that she was in fact well liked by others, she might sincerely declare that her life had matched up in many important ways to her ideals. So an "ideal information" conc ept of WLS happiness would count Tammy as already happy. Thus the proposed definition does not yield the theory of welfare that the eudaimonist finds attractive. The eudaimonist wants to say that Tammy would have been a lot happier and a lot better off if she had been better informed about her circumstances.
If we define happiness by appeal to the level of satisfaction Tammy would have had if she had been well informed, we end up saying that she is already very happy and faring well.
Conclusion
The most popular concepts of happiness among psychologists and philosophers nowadays are WLS concepts of happiness. I have attempted to show that there are hundreds of logically distinct ways in which a WLS conception of happiness can be developed. However, every precise conception is either a version that requires actual satisfaction with life as a whole or a version that requires hypothetical satisfaction with life as a whole. 36 I have presented considerations designed to show that a person can be happy (in any familiar sense that might be relevant to eudaimonism) at a time even though he is not actually making any judgment about his life as a whole at that time. I have also presented considerations designed to show that a person can be happy (again in any relevant sense of term) even though it is not correct to say that if he were to form a judgment about his life as a whole at that time, it would be a favorable judgment. These considerations strongly suggest that those who are attracted by the eudaimonistic intuition ("happiness is the Good") should avoid defining happiness in terms of whole life satisfaction.
